Proactive Population-Risk Based Defense Against Denial of Cyber-Physical
  Service Attacks by Pawlick, Jeffrey & Zhu, Quanyan
Proactive Population-Risk Based Defense Against
Denial of Cyber-Physical Service Attacks
Jeffrey Pawlick
New York University Tandon School of Engineering
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Email: jpawlick@nyu.edu
Quanyan Zhu
New York University Tandon School of Engineering
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Email: quanyan.zhu@nyu.edu
Abstract—While the Internet of things (IoT) promises to
improve areas such as energy efficiency, health care, and trans-
portation, it is highly vulnerable to cyberattacks. In particular,
DDoS attacks work by overflowing the bandwidth of a server. But
many IoT devices form part of cyber-physical systems (CPS).
Therefore, they can be used to launch a “physical” denial-of-
service attack (PDoS) in which IoT devices overflow the “physical
bandwidth” of a CPS. In this paper, we quantify the population-
based risk to a group of IoT devices targeted by malware for
a PDoS attack. To model the recruitment of bots, we extend a
traditional game-theoretic concept and create a “Poisson signaling
game.” Then we analyze two different mechanisms (legal and
economic) to deter botnet recruitment. We find that 1) defenders
can bound botnet activity and 2) legislating a minimum level of
security has only a limited effect, while incentivizing active defense
can decrease botnet activity arbitrarily. This work provides a
quantitative foundation for designing proactive defense against
PDoS attacks.
Index Terms—Denial of service, botnet, Internet of things,
cyber-physical systems, game theory, mechanism design
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE IOT AND PDOS ATTACKS
The Internet of things (IoT) is a “dynamic global net-
work infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities based on
standard and interoperable communication protocols where
physical and virtual ‘things’ have identities, physical attributes,
and virtual personalities” [2]. Unpacking this definition, we
can highlight three features of the IoT: it is 1) decentralized,
2) heterogeneous, and 3) connected to the physical world.
The IoT is decentralized because nodes have “self-configuring
capabilities,” some amount of local intelligence, and incentives
which are not aligned with the other nodes. It is heteroge-
neous because diverse “things” constantly enter and leave the
IoT, facilitated by “standard and interoperable communication
protocols.” Finally, IoT devices are connected to the physical
world, i.e., they are part of cyber-physical systems (CPS). They
may influence behavior, control the flow of traffic, and optimize
home lighting.
A. Difficulties in Securing the Internet of Things
While the IoT promises gains in efficiency, customization,
and communication ability, it also raises new challenges. One
of these challenges is security. IoT devices are often designed
without security in mind. The social aspect of IoT devices also
makes them vulnerable to attack through social engineering.
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Figure 1: Conceptual diagram of a PDoS attack. 1) Attack
sponsor hires botnet herder. 2) Botnet herder uses server to
manage recruitment. 3) Malware scans for vulnerable IoT
devices and begins cascading infection. 4) Botnet herder uses
IoT devices (e.g., HVAC controllers) to deplete the bandwidth
of a cyber-physical service (e.g., electrical power).
Moreover, the dynamic and heterogeneous attributes of the
IoT create a large attack surface. Once compromised, these
“things” can also be used as vectors for attack. The most
notable example has been the Mirai botnet attack on Dyn
in 2016. Approximately 100,000 bots—largely belonging to
the (IoT)—participated in an unprecedented attack against the
domain name server (DNS) for Twitter, Reddit, Github, and
the New York Times. Outages at these websites lasted for over
two hours [13].
B. Denial of Cyber-Physical Service Attacks
In general, DDoS attacks work by overflowing some type of
cyber-layer bandwidth of their targets. But many IoT devices
are part of CPS. Therefore, in addition to cyber-layer resources,
IoT devices also draw upon physical-layer resources.
As one example, consider the navigation app Wayz [1].
Wayz uses real-time traffic information to attempt to find
optimal navigation routes. Due to its large number of users,
Wayz also influences traffic. Potentially, if too many users are
directed to a given road, they can consume all of the physical
bandwidth of that road and cause unexpected congestion.
Intelligent adversaries could manipulate Wayz reports in order
to deliberately cause congestion.
Another example can be found in healthcare. Smart lighting
systems (which deploy, e.g., time-of-flight sensors) can sense
when room occupants fall [18]. These systems can be used to
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alert emergency responders about a medical emergency in an
assisted living center or the home of someone who is aging.
But an attacker could potentially trigger many of these alerts
at the same time. This could deplete the response bandwidth
of emergency personnel.
We call such an attack a denial of cyber-physical service
attack. To distinguish the physical-layer attack from a cyber-
layer DDoS, we also use the acronym PDoS (Physical Denial
of Service). In the rest of the paper, we will consider one
specific instance of a PDoS attack, although our analysis is
not limited to this particular example.
Our PDoS example is the infection and manipulation of
a large number of IoT-based heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) controllers, in order to cause a sudden
addition of load to the power grid. An attacker uses the HVAC
controllers to “flood” the electrical grid with power load. Since
energy companies look to IoT HVAC devices to perform peak
shifting and demand response [5], sudden power loads from
infected devices can impose costs.
C. Modeling the PDoS Recruitment Stage
Figure 1 gives a conceptual diagram of a PDoS attack. Our
defense mechanism targets the third stage in particular. We
model an attacker who scans a wide range of IP addresses,
looking for devices with weak security settings. We envision
malware similar to Mirai, which attempts a simple brute
force attack. Mirai checks for a list of factory-default user-
names and passwords (e.g. root/admin, admin/admin,
root/123456) [10], [8].
The essence of the recruitment process is scanning a popula-
tion of IP addresses at a low cost. In order to quantify the risk
of malware infection, we create a game-theoretic model. Game
theory provides a set of tools to measure strategic interactions
between multiple parties with possibly misaligned incentives.
Parties in game theory are assumed to act intelligently and
in their own self-interest. This makes game theory a good
condidate to quantify the decentralized and vulnerable IoT.
In particular, we combine two game-theoretic models known
as signaling games [11], [12], [6] and Poisson games [15], [16].
Signaling games model interactions between two parties, one
of which possesses information unknown to the other party.
While signaling games consider only two players, we extend
this model by allowing the number of target IoT devices to
be a random variable (r.v.) that follows a Poisson distribution.
This captures the fact that the malware scans a large number of
targets. Moreover, we allow the targets to have heterogeneous
abilities to detect malicious login attempts.
D. Contributions and Related Work
We make the following principle contributions:
1) We propose a type of IoT malware attack called a
denial of cyber-physical services (PDoS) attack, which
consumes bandwidth of a physical resource in a CPS.
2) We develop a model called Poisson signaling games
(PSG) to quantify the population-based risk of malware
infection. This model requires extending signaling games
for cases of an unknown number of heterogeneous re-
ceivers.
3) We find the pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilib-
ria of the PSG model for PDoS.
4) We analyze legal and economic mechanisms to deter
botnet recruitment.
5) In equilibrium, we find that 1) defenders can bound
botnet activity, and 2) legislating a minimum level of
security has only a limited effect, while incentivizing
active defense can decrease botnet activity arbitrarily.
1) Related Work: PSG build on a series of existing models
for Poisson games and signaling games [11], [6], [17], [15]. Wu
et al. use game theory to design defense mechanisms against
DDoS attacks [19]. But the defense mechanisms relate to
mitigating the actual attack (the flood of traffic against a target
system), while we focus on botnet recruitment. Bensoussan et
al. use a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model to study
the growth of a botnet [4]. But IoT devices in our model
maintain beliefs about the reliability of incoming messages,
some of which are issued by malware attempting to recruit
devices for a botnet. In this way, our paper considers the need
to trust legitimate messages. Finally, load altering attacks [14],
[3] to the power grid are an example of PDoS attacks. But
PDoS attacks can also deal with other resources.
2) Outline of the Paper: In Section II, we propose PSG to
quantify the population risk due to PDoS attacks. Section III
obtains the equilibrium in all parameter regimes of the model.
Some of these equilibria are harmful for power companies
and IoT users. Therefore, we design proactive mechanisms to
improve the equilibria in Section IV. We underline the key
contributions of the paper in Section V.
II. POISSON SIGNALING GAMES
In this section, we model PDoS using PSG. Figure 2 depicts
a PSG, and Table I summarizes the nomenclature.
A. Poisson Signaling Game Structure
Signaling games are a class of dynamic, two-player, infor-
mation asymmetric games between a sender S and a receiver
R ([11], [12], [7]). In our case, S represents either a user or a
botnet scanner, which attempts to access an IoT HVAC device.
R represents the device.
1) Signaling Games: S possesses some information called a
type x ∈ X which is unknown to R. Here, x refers to whether S
is legitimate, i.e., the intended user of the HVAC device (x = l),
or deceptive, i.e., a botnet scan (x = d). Let the probability
that S belongs to each type be denoted by qS(x). Based on her
type, S chooses an action typically called a message m ∈ M .
In our case, m refers to whether S attempts to login to the
device (m = p) or withdraws, i.e., does not attempt to login
(m = w). Our goal will be to force S of type d to drop out of
the interaction: to play action w rather than action p.
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Figure 2: PSG model the third stage of a PDoS attack. A
sender of type x chooses an action m which is observed by
an unknown number of receivers. The receivers have multiple
types y ∈ Y . Each type may observe different evidence e ∈ E .
Based on m and e, each type of receiver chooses an action a.
2) Evidence: Next, R observes m, but does not know x
with certainty. In typical signaling games (e.g. [6], [11], [12]),
R only uses m to form his belief about the likelihood with
which S has each type x ∈ X . But in botnet recruitment, R
observes additional evidence about whether login attempts are
legitimate: the timing of failed login attempts, the source IP,
etc. Therefore, we use an augmented model of signaling games
called signaling games with evidence [17], in which R observes
exogenous evidence e ∈ E . The evidence can suggest that S is
a legitimate user (e = n) or that S is a botnet scanner (e = b).
3) Multiple and Heterogeneous Receivers: In addition, we
consider multiple receivers. In other words, we allow S to
attempt to login to multiple devices. This is the case when
a botnet scanner attempts to gain access to devices at many
different IP addresses. Let the number of receivers be drawn
from a Poisson r.v. with parameter λ. These different receivers
also have different capabilities to detect whether a login is
malicious. Therefore, we consider that R has multiple types
y ∈ Y . Let y = k denote a receiver type with no ability
to detect deceptive logins (we say a weak receiver), and let
y = o (a strong receiver) and y = v (an active receiver) denote
receiver types with some ability to detect deceptive logins1. Let
the probability that each receiver belongs to each type y ∈ Y
be denoted by qR(y).
In order to formalize these capabilities, for y ∈ Y, let
δRy (e | x,m) denote the probability that R of type y observes
evidence e given the sender’s real type x and the sender’s
action2 m. In order to capture the idea that evidence is useless
for R of type k, but useful for R of types o and v, we have
δk (b | d, p) = δk (b | l, p) , (1)
1The difference between type o and type v is clarified later in the section.
2If S plays m = w, then the interaction ends and δRy does not matter.
Table I: Nomenclature of PSG
Player Information
Players S, R
Count of R Poisson{λ}
Types, Actions, and Utility Functions
Type of S x ∈ X = {l, d}
Type of R y ∈ Y = {k, o, v }
Action of S m ∈ M = {p, w }
Evidence e ∈ E = {n, b}
Action of R a ∈ A = {t, g, f }
Total Action Count of R c = [ ct cg c f ]T
Utility of S US (m, c) = [USx (m, c)] x∈X
Utility of R UR (x,m, a) = [URy (x,m, a)]y∈Y
Priors, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility Functions
Prior Probabilities qS (x), qR (y)
Evidence Probability δy (e | x,m)
Mixed Strategies σSx (m), σRy (a |m, e)
Belief of R µRy (x |m, e)
Expected Utility of S U¯Sx (σSx , σR )
Expected Utility of R U¯Ry
(
σRy |m, e, µRy
)
δy (b | d, p) > δy (b | l, p) , y ∈ {o, v} . (2)
Equation (1) states that, for R of type k, the probability of
suspicious evidence is the same whether S is legitimate or
deceptive. On the other hand, Eq. (2) states that, for R of types
o and v, the probability of suspicious evidence is higher when
S is deceptive than when S is legitimate.
4) Receiver Belief and Action: R uses e in addition to m to
update his belief about the type of S. Let µRy (x |m, e) denote
the likelihood with which R of each type y thinks that S is of
type x, given S’s action m and evidence e.
Using this belief, R chooses an action a ∈ A. We consider
three actions. Let a = t denote a decision to trust S, i.e., to give
S access to the device. Let a = g denote a decision to ignore
S, i.e., to reject the login attempt but not do anything else to
report suspicious behavior. Finally, let a = f denote the use of
active defense against suspicious login activity. Active defense
could include reporting the activity or attempting to shutdown
a botmaster or CC server of the botnet. We assume that not
all devices are capable of participating in active defense. Let
R of type v represent those devices capable of active defense,
and R of type o represent those devices not capable of active
defense.
Finally, let ct, cg, and cf denote the count of receivers which
choose to trust, ignore, and use active defense against the
sender, respectively. Let c be a column vector containing ct,
cg, and cf as entries. This column vector falls in the space
Z(A), the set of all possible counts of each action.
B. Utility, Mixed Strategies, and Expected Utility
Let US : M × Z(A) → R |X | be a vector-valued function
s.t. the vector US (m, c) = [USx (m, c)] x∈X gives the utility of
senders of each type x ∈ X for sending action m if the count
of receivers which choose each action is given by c. Let the
utility be zero if S withdraws: USx (w, c) = 0 for all x ∈ X and
c ∈ Z(A).
Next, assume that the utility of each receiver does not depend
directly on the actions of the other receivers. The receivers
are still endogeneously coupled, since all of their strategies
affect the optimal strategy of S. But there is no exogenous
coupling. Define a vector-valued utility function for R by UR :
X × M × A→ R |Y |, such that UR (x,m, a) = [URy (x,m, a)]y∈Y
gives the utility of receivers of each type y ∈ Y if the sender’s
true type is x, the sender chooses action m, and the receiver
chooses action y. This utility is zero if S withdraws. We also
assume that it is zero if R chooses ignore (a = g). See Table
II for the full characteristics of the utility functions.
1) Mixed Strategies: For S, let σS
l
∈ ΣS
l
be a mixed strategy
such that σS
l
(m) gives the probability with which S of type l
plays each action m ∈ M . Similarly, let σS
d
(m) ∈ ΣS
d
give the
mixed-strategy probability with which S of type d plays each
message m ∈ M . We take ΣS
l
= ΣS
d
.
For receivers of each type y ∈ Y, define σRy ∈ ΣRy such that
σRy (a |m, e) gives the probability with which he plays action
a after observing sender action m and evidence e. We also
define a vector of the strategies of all the receiver types by
σR (a |m, e) = [σRy (a |m, e)]y∈Y ∈ ΣR .
2) Expected Utility Functions: Denote the expected utility
of a sender of type x ∈ X by U¯Sx : ΣSx × ΣR → R. Notice that
the strategies of all receiver types must be taken into account.
This expected utility is given by
U¯Sx (σSx , σR) =
∑
m∈M
∑
c∈Z(A)
USx (m, c)σSx (m)P
{
c | σR, x,m} .
Here, P{c | σR, x,m} is the probability with which c gives the
count of receivers that play each action. Myerson shows that,
due to the aggregation and decomposition properties of the
Poisson r.v., ct, cg, and cf are also Poisson r.v. [15], [16].
Therefore, P{c | σR, x,m} is given by
P
{
c | σR, x,m} = ∏
a∈A
eλa
λcaa
ca!
, (3)
where
λa = λ
∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
qR (y) δy (e | x,m)σRy (a |m, e) . (4)
In the next subsection, we will argue that the utility function
of S is approximately linear in c. Because the expectation op-
erator is also linear, we show in Appendix A that the expected
utility function depends on the set of Poisson parameters λa,
a ∈ A, rather than on the whole pdf. Define the scalars ωtx,
ω
g
x, and ω
f
x such that, for all x ∈ X, ω fx < ωgx < 0 < ωtx .
These scalars represent the magnitude of the utility that S
of type x ∈ X receives for each receiver who plays trust,
ignore, and active defense, respectively, when S participates.
Let ωd = [ ωtd ωgd ω fd ]T and ωl = [ ωtl ωgl ω fl ]T .
Then for each type x ∈ X, USx (p, c) =
∑
a∈A
ωax ca . This gives
U¯Sx (σSx , σR) = λσSx (p)∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
qR (y) δy (e | x, p)σRy (a | p, e)ωax . (5)
Next, define the expected utility of a receiver of type y ∈ Y
by U¯Ry : ΣRy → R, such that
U¯Ry
(
σRy |m, e, µRy
)
=∑
x∈X
∑
a∈{t, f }
µRy (x |m, e)σRy (a |m, e)URy (x,m, a) . (6)
gives the utility that R expects for using mixed strategy σRy
when S plays m, R observes evidence e, he forms belief
µRy (x |m, e) about whether S has each of the possible sender
types x ∈ X .
C. Denial of Cyber-Physical Service Attacks
PDoS attacks cause damage to the physical component
of a CPS. Therefore, knowledge of the CPS is required to
approximate the utility functions of the PSG. Of course, power
generation and distribution networks are complex. In order to
focus on the game-theoretic model here, we use a simple utility
function as a foundation for future work, and we focus on
identifying when the model applies.
First, note that PDoS attacks are not limited to HVAC
systems. We have already given examples of attacks on traf-
fic patterns influenced by the Wayz navigation app and on
emergency medical response influenced by fall detection in
smart lighting systems. In other words, our contribution to
consider general PDoS attacks does not depend on the specific
implementation details of HVAC control.
Within HVAC control, though, a sudden power load could
affect voltage regulation in a smart grid in multiple ways.
Clearly, power regulation becomes highly non-linear when
generator safeguards trip and cascading failures occur. But less
severe load regulation is a day-to-day occurrence. In typical op-
erating ranges, load can be shed or possibly relocated [14]. We
approximate the cost of regulation by a function that is linear
in the amount of excess load caused by infected IoT devices.
Specifically, we have used the coefficient ωt
d
to represent the
utility cost created by one IoT HVAC device which is infected
and used in a PDoS attack. This approximation is limited to
ranges near typical operating loads.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the relevant equilibrium concept
for PSG. Then we obtain the equilibrium results by parameter
region. Lastly, we present an algorithm by which devices use
the equilibrium results to choose their actions.
A. Equilibrium Concept for PSG
An equilibrium of a game is a profile of strategies for all
players, in which the strategy of each player is optimal given
the strategies of the other players. Equilibria, therefore, model
deadlocks between rational players.
PSG are dynamic games of incomplete information. Perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) is an appropriate concept
for these games. Bayesian means that players (i.e., R) who lack
information (i.e., x) maintain beliefs (i.e., µRy (x)) for which
their strategies are optimal. The term perfect requires beliefs to
Table II: Characteristics of PSG for PDoS
# Expression Meaning
C1 ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , a ∈ A, c ∈ Z (A) , S and R get zero utility if S withdraws.
USx (w, c) =URy (x, w, a) = 0.
C2 ∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, URy (x, p, g) = 0. R get zero utility for ignoring.
C3 ∀y ∈ Y, URy (d, p, t) < 0 < URy (l, p, t). R lose (gain) utility from trusting a deceptive (legitimate) S.
C4 δk (b | d, p) = δk (b | l, p) . Weak R have no ability to differentiate between types of S.
C5 δo (b | d, p) > δo (b | l, p) , δv (b | d, p) > δv (b | l, p) . Other R have some ability to differentiate between types of S.
C6 ∀x ∈ X, UR
k
(x, p, f ) =URo (x, p, f ) = −∞. R which are not active types prefer not to use active defense.
C7 URv (d, p, f ) < 0 < URv (l, p, t). Active R gain (lose) utility for active defenseagainst a deceptive (legitimate) S.
be updated rationally based on the actions of the other players.
This forces each strategy to be optimal for all subgames of the
interaction (c.f. [7]). Definition 1 applies PBNE to the PSG.
Definition 1. (Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) Let
U¯Sx (σSx , σR∗) and U¯Ry
(
σRy |m, e, µRy
)
be given by Eq. (5)
and Eq. (6), respectively. Then strategy profile and belief
(σS∗, σR∗, µR) is a PBNE of the PSG if Eq. (7-11) hold.
∀x ∈ X, σS∗x ∈ arg max
σSx ∈ΣSx
U¯Sx (σSx , σR∗). (7)
∀y,m, e ∈ Y × M × E, σR∗y ∈ arg max
σRy ∈ΣRy
U¯Ry (σRy |m, e, µRy ), (8)
µRy (d | p, e) =
δy (e | d, p)σSd (p) qS (d)∑
x∈X
δy (e | x, p)σSx (p) qS (x)
(9)
if
∑
x∈X
δy (e | x, p)σSx (p) qS (x) > 0, and, otherwise,
µRy (d | p, e) ∈ [0, 1] . (10)
In addition, we have
∀e ∈ E, µRy (l | p, e) = 1 − µRy (d | p, e) . (11)
B. Narrowing the Equilibrium Search
In order to simplify analysis, without loss of generality
(wlog), let the utility functions be the same for all receiver
types (except when a = f ), i.e.,
∀x ∈ X, URk (x, p, t) = URo (x, p, t) = URv (x, p, t).
Also wlog, let the quality of the detectors for types y ∈ {o, v}
be the same:
∀e ∈ E, x ∈ X, δo(e | x, p) = δv(e | x, p).
1) Parameter Assumptions: We now obtain equilibria under
natural assumptions on the PSG parameters. First, assume
that legitimate senders always participate: σS
l
(p) = 1. This
is natural for our application, because IoT HVAC users will
always attempt to login.
Second, assume that R of all types trust login attempts which
appear to be legitimate (i.e., give evidence e = n). This is
satisfied for
qS (d) < U
R
k
(l, p, t)
UR
k
(l, p, t) −UR
k
(d, p, t) . (12)
Third, we consider the likely behavior of R of type o when a
login attempt is suspicious. Assume that he will ignore, rather
than trust, the login. This occurs under the parameter regime
qS (d) > U˜
R
o (l, p, t)
U˜Ro (l, p, t) − U˜Ro (d, p, t)
, (13)
using the shorthand notation
U˜Ro (l, p, t) = URo (l, p, t) δ0 (b | l, p) ,
U˜Ro (d, p, t) = URo (d, p, t) δ0 (b | d, p) .
The fourth assumption addresses the action of R of type v
when a login attempt is suspicious. The optimal action depends
on his belief µRo (d | p, b) that S is deceptive. The belief, in
turn, depends on the mixed-strategy probability with which
deceptive S participate. Intuitively, if σS
d
(p) is high, then R
may benefit from using active defense (a = f ). If σS
d
(p) is
very low, then R should trust the login attempt. What should
R do at middle ranges of σS
d
(p)? We assume that there is some
σS
d
(p) for which R should ignore (a = g) the login attempt.
This is satisfied if3
¬∃φ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. U¯Rv (t | p, b, µRv ) > 0
and U¯Rv ( f | p, b, µRv ) > 0 given σSd (p) = φ. (14)
This simplifies analysis, but can be removed if necessary.
2) Equilibrium Strategies from Eq. (12-14): Lemma 1 sum-
marizes the equilibrium results thus far. Legitimate S partici-
pate. R which do not use active defense ignore suspicious login
attempts. All receiver types trust login attempts which appear
legitimate. R of type k, since he cannot differentiate between
login attempts, trusts all of them. The proof follows from the
optimality conditions in Eq. (7-11) and the assumptions in Eq.
(12-14).
Lemma 1. (Constant PBNE Strategies) If σS
d
(p) = 1 and
Eq. (12-14) hold, then the following equilibrium strategies are
implied:
σS∗l (p) = 1, σR∗o (g | p, b) = 1, σR∗k (t | p, b) = 1,
σR∗o (t | p, n) = σR∗v (t | p, n) = σR∗k (t | p, n) = 1.
3We abuse notation slightly to write U¯Rv (a |m, e, µRy ) for the expected
utility that R of type v obtains by playing action a.
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Figure 3: Model of a PSG under Lemma 1. Only one of many R is depicted. After the types x and y, of S and R, respectively,
are drawn, S chooses whether to participate. Then a detector emits evidence that S appears benign or malicious. R uses this
to choose an action. Lemma 1 determines all equilibrium strategies except σS∗
d
(•) , σR∗o (• | p, b) , and σR∗v (• | p, b) , which are
marked by the purple, dashed information sets.
Figure 3 depicts the results of Lemma 1. The remaining
equilibrium strategies to be obtained are denoted by the purple,
dashed information sets. These strategies are σR∗o (• | p, b) and
σR∗v (• | p, b), as well as σS∗d (p). Intuitively, σS∗d (p) depends on
whether R of type o and type v will ignore and/or use active
defense to oppose suspicious login attempts.
C. Region Boundaries
The remaining equilibrium strategies fall into four parameter
regions. In order to delineate these regions, we define two
quantities.
Let TDRv (URv , δv) denote a threshold which determines the
optimal action of R of type v if σS
d
(p) = 1. If qS(d) >
TDRv (URv , δv), then the receiver uses active defense with some
probability. Equation (8) can be used to show that
TDRv
(
URv , δv
)
=
U˜Rv (l, p, f )
U˜Rv (l, p, f ) − U˜Rv (d, p, f )
,
where we have used the shorthand notation:
U˜Rv (l, p, f ) = URv (l, p, f ) δv (b | l, p) ,
U˜Rv (d, p, f ) = URv (d, p, f ) δv (b | d, p) .
Next, define the quantity BPS
d
(
ωd, qR, δ
)
=∑
y∈Y
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
qR (y) δy (e | d, p)σRy (a | p, e)ωad .
This is the benefit which S of type d receives for choosing
m = p, i.e., for participating in the interaction. If this benefit is
negative, then S will withdraw. Let BPS
d
(
ωd, qR, δ | ak, ao, av
)
denote the benefit of participating when receivers use the pure
strategies:
σRk (ak | p, b) = σRo (ao | p, b) = σRv (av | p, b) = 1.
D. Equilibrium Strategies
We now have Theorem 1, which predicts the risk of malware
infection in the remaining parameter regions. The proof is in
Appendix B.
Theorem 1. (PBNE within Regions) If σS
d
(p) = 1 and Eq.
(12-14) hold, then σR∗o (• | p, b), σR∗v (• | p, b), and σS∗d (p) vary
within four regions. They are listed in Table III.
1) Equilibrium 1: Strong and active receivers ignore suspi-
cious login attempts. But this is not enough to deter deceptive
senders from participating. This is a poor equilibrium, because
σS∗
d
(p) = 1.
2) Equilibrium 2: Here, qS(d) > TDRv . Therefore, R of type
v use active defense. But BPS
d
(• | t, g, f ) > 0, which means that
the active defense is not enough to deter deceptive senders. We
still have σS∗
d
(p) = 1.
3) Equilibrium 3: R of type o and type v ignore suspicious
login attempts. But here, BPS
d
(• | t, g, g) < 0, which means that
the cost of being ignored is sufficient to deter deceptive S. R
of types o and v ignore with probability
σR∗o (g | p, b) = σR∗v (g | p, b) =
ωtd
[(
qR (0) + qR (v)
)
δo (b | d, p)
(
ωtd − ωgd
)]−1
, (15)
and trust with probability
σR∗o (t | p, b) = σR∗v (t | p, b) = 1 − σR∗o (g | p, b) . (16)
Deceptive S participate with reduced probability
σS∗d (p) =
1
qS (d)
(
U˜Ro (l, p, t)
U˜Ro (l, p, t) − U˜Ro (d, p, t)
)
. (17)
4) Equilibrium 4: Here, being ignored is not enough to
deter deceptive S from participating fully. Since qS(d) > TDRv ,
though, R of type v use active defense. This is enough to drive
Table III: Equilibrium Regions of the PSG for PDoS
qS (d) < TDRv (•) qS (d) > TDRv (•)
BPS
d
(• | t, g, g) < 0, Equilibrium 3
σS∗(p) < 1
BPS
d
(• | t, g, f ) < 0 0 < σ
R∗
o (t | p, b), σR∗o (g | p, b) < 1
0 < σR∗v (t | p, b), σR∗v (g | p, b) < 1
BPS
d
(• | t, g, g) > 0, Equilibrium 4
σS∗(p) < 1
BPS
d
(• | t, g, f ) < 0 Equilibrium 1 σ
R∗
o (g | p, b) = 1
σS∗(p) = 1 0 < σR∗v (g | p, b),
σR∗o (g | p, b) = 1 σR∗v ( f | p, b) < 1
BPS
d
(• | t, g, g) > 0, σ
R∗
v (g | p, b) = 1 Equilibrium 2
σS∗(p) = 1
BPS
d
(• | t, g, f ) > 0 σ
R∗
o (g | p, b) = 1
σR∗v ( f | p, b) = 1
σS∗
d
(p) < 1. R of type o always ignores: σR∗o (g | p, b) = 1. R
of type v uses active defense with probability
σR∗v ( f | p, b) =
ωt
d
qR (k) + ωg
d
(
qR (o) + qR (v))(
ω
g
d
− ω f
d
)
qR (v) δv (v | d, p)
, (18)
and otherwise ignores the login attempt:
σR∗v (g | p, b) = 1 − σR∗v ( f | p, b) . (19)
Deceptive S participate with reduced probability
σS∗d (p) =
1
qS (d)
(
U˜Rv (l, p, f )
U˜Rv (l, p, f ) − U˜Rv (d, p, f )
)
. (20)
Equilibrium 1 and Equilibrium 2 are poor results because
infection of devices is not deterred at all. The focus of Section
IV will be to shift the PBNE to the other equilibrium regions,
in which infection of devices is deterred to some degree.
E. Decision Algorithm for IoT Devices
Recall that we consider a type of brute force attack model
(similar to Mirai), in which malware scans a range of IP
addresses and tries a list of factory-default usernames and
passwords. R of type y = k model those IoT devices which do
not use strong passwords. We assume that they will be infected.
Instead, we focus on proactive defense mechanisms which
are addressed to strong and active receivers. In the status quo,
these devices ignore malicious login attempts. One of our
defense mechanisms will incentivize R of type y = v to use
active defense against the malicious logins that they detect.
Using Algorithm 1, devices can leverage the PSG equilib-
rium to decide upon which action to play. The algorithm uses
a fundamental way of gathering evidence: tracking consecutive
failed login attempts. In general, devices can rely on more spe-
cialized routines to detect malware, such as examining timing,
source IP, duration, etc. Algorithm 1 is feasible particularly for
the simple brute force attacks that we envision.
Line 2 states that type k receivers (IoT HVAC devices)
have implemented either no passwords or default passwords.
Therefore, in the worst case, they play trust immediately.
Type o and type v receivers have implemented stronger pass-
words. In Line 4, they prompt the user (S) for the password.
Algorithm 1 Proactive Defense Algorithm for R
1) Given: Password PW0; allowed attempts τ; σR∗o , σR∗v .
2) If: y = k,
a) Then: Set action=trust. Exit.
3) Else: Set ATT = 1.
4) While: ATT ≤ τ,
a) Prompt: for PWATT.
b) If: matches{PWATT,PW0},
i) Then: Set e = n. Set action=trust. Exit.
c) Else:
i) Set: ATT = ATT + 1. Go to 4.
5) Set: evidence e = b.
6) If: y = o,
a) Then: Set prg = σR∗o (g | p, e).
b) Draw: nAction ∼ Bernoulli{prg}.
c) If: nAction = 0,
i) Then: Set action=trust. Exit.
d) Else: Set action=ignore. Exit.
7) Else: (y = v)
a) Set: prf = σR∗v ( f | p, e).
b) Draw: nAction ∼ Bernoulli{prf}.
c) If: nAction = 0,
i) Then: Set action=ignore. Exit.
d) Else: Set action=activeDefense. Exit.
Up to τ attempts are allowed. If the user inputs the correct
password before exhausting her attempts, then e = n, i.e., the
login attempt appears to be legitimate. If the user exhausts the
attempts, then we set e = b, i.e., the login appears suspicious.
Next, based on e, Line 6 and Line 7 choose the best
actions for R of types o and v, respectively. Of course, for
cases where the optimal strategy σR∗o or σR∗v is a mixed
strategy, the receiver is completely indifferent between the
actions over which he mixes. Practically speaking, both actions
are optimal. The probabilistic actions in Algorithm 1 can be
seen as equilibrium frequencies of the whole population of
receivers.
Note that the repetition of login attempts achieves two pur-
poses. First, it decreases the false-positive rate of the detector.
Second, it filters out login attempts from parties which are
unauthorized but not actively malicious4. Allowing τ login
attempts prompts mistaken users to stop attempting access
before triggering an alert.
IV. MECHANISM DESIGN
Table III, together with Eq. (15-20), give the equilibrium
results of the PSG. These results enable prediction of the
outcome of PDoS recruitment when IoT HVAC devices and
malware that is scanning for vulnerable devices both react
optimally to each other. Mechanism design comes from the
opposite perspective from equilibrium prediction. The equilib-
rium results are delineated by the quantities qS, TDRv (URv , δv)
4For instance, an IoT user may inadvertently attempt to access the wrong
device. A system which immediately sets e = b could trigger a damaging
active defense by R of type v, such as reporting complaints against the user.
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Figure 4: Legally requiring basic protection increases qR(o) and decreases qR(k). Plot (a) shows transitions from Equilibrium
1 to 3. This occurs early for high ωg
d
. Plot (b) shows that σS∗
d
(p) is reduced, but only to a fixed probability, because as qR(o)
increases, R of y ∈ {o, v} decrease the rate at which they ignore login attempts (c).
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Figure 5: Incentivizing R of type v to use active defense increases URv (d, p, f ). Starting from Equilibrium 1, this may bring
the game (a) to Equilibrium 2 (in which malware scanning is not deterred) or Equilibrium 3 (in which it is deterred) (b). Only
small levels of active defense are necessary if ω f
d
is large (c).
and BPS
d
(ωd, qR, δ). Mechanism design manipulates qS, qR,
δo, δv, ωd, and URv in order to obtain a desired equilibrium.
A. Legislating Basic Security
Malware which infects IoT devices is successful because
many IoT devices are poorly secured. Therefore, one mech-
anism design idea is to legally require better authentication
methods, in order to decrease qR(k) and increase qR(o).
Figure 4 depicts the results. Plot (a) shows that decreasing
qR(k) and increasing qR(o) moves the game from Equilibrium
1 to Equilibrium 3. But Plot (b) shows that this only causes a
fixed decrease in σS∗
d
(p), regardless of the amount of decrease
in qR(k). Plot (c) shows the reason. As qR(o) increases, it
is incentive-compatible for receivers to ignore messages with
progressively lower probability σR∗y (g | p, b), y ∈ {o, v}. Rather
than forcing deceptive S to withdraw, increasing qR(o) only
decreases the incentive for receivers to ignore suspicious login
attempts.
B. Incentivizing Active Defense
Another reason for the proliferation of IoT malware is that
most devices which are secure (i.e., R of type y = o) do not
take any actions against malicious login attempts except to
ignore them (i.e., to play a = g). But there is almost no cost to
malware scanners for making a large number of login attempts
which are ignored. There is a lack of economic pressure which
would force σS∗
d
(p) < 1, unless qR(0) is almost 1.
Therefore, another design approach to incentivize a small
number of IoT devices to use active defense. At the least,
this includes denying login attempts after a number of failed
passwords. It could also include gathering data about the attack
to mitigate its effectiveness on other devices, or reporting the
malicious activity to an ISP upstream of the attacker.
Figure 5 shows the effect of providing an incentive
URv (d, p, f ) for active defense. This incentive moves the game
from Equilibrium 1 to either Equilibrium 2 or Equilibrium 3,
depending on whether BPS
d
(• | t, g, f ) is positive (Plot (a)). In
Equilibrium 3, the participation rate of deceptive S is decreased
(Plot (b)). Finally, Plot (c) shows that only a small amount of
active defense σR∗v ( f | p, b) is necessary, particularly for high
values of5 ω f
d
.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this section, we summarize the principle insights of the
paper, and then we note areas for future work. First, we argue
that the defender can bound the activity level of the botnet.
5In Fig. 5 Plot (c), σR∗v ( f | p, b) = 1 for ω fd = −12.
Recall that Equilibrium 3 and Equilibrium 4 force σS∗
d
(p) < 1.
That is, they decrease the participation of the malware scanner.
But another interpretation is possible. In Eq. (17) and Eq. (20),
note that the product σS∗
d
(p) qS (d) is bounded. This product
can be understood as the total activity of botnet scanners: a
combination of prior probability of deceptive senders and the
effort that deceptive senders exert. Bensoussan et al. note that
the operators of the Confiker botnet of 2008-2009 were forced
to limit its activity [4], [9]. High activity levels would have
attracted too much attention. The authors of [4] confirm this
result analytically, using a dynamic game based on an SIS
infection model. Interestingly, our result agrees with [4], but
using a different framework. Indeed, by using a signaling game,
our model perhaps even more directly captures the notion of
staying “under the radar.”
Second, we compare the effects of legal and economic
mechanisms to deter recruitment for PDoS. Figure 4 showed
that σS∗
d
(p) can only be reduced by a fixed factor by mandating
security for more and more devices. In this example, we found
that strategic behavior worked against legal requirements6. By
comparison, Fig. 5 showed that σS∗
d
(p) can be driven arbitrarily
low by providing an economic incentive URv (d, p, f ) to use
active defense.
Three areas remain for future work. A dynamic model can
be used to model the effect of voltage load on the power
grid. We can also consider the effect of load near thresholds
at which the system is highly nonlinear. Finally, we can
design optimal detectors δo and δv by examining the way that
equilibria change as the detector properties are varied along an
ROC curve. These should be effective additions to the present
foundation of using PSG to model PDoS.
APPENDIX A
SIMPLIFICATION OF SENDER EXPECTED UTILITY
Each each component of c is distributed according to a Pois-
son r.v.. The components are independent, so P{c | σR, x,m} =∏
a∈A
P{ca | σR, x,m}. Recall that S receives zero utility when he
plays m = w. So we can choose m = p : U¯Sx (σSx , σR) =
σSx (p)
∑
c∈Z(A)
∏
a∈A
P
{
ca | σR, x, p
} (
ωtxct + ω
g
xcg + ω
f
xcf
)
.
Some of the probability terms can be summed over their
support. These reduce to 1. We are left with
U¯Sx (σSx , σR) = σSx (p)
∑
a∈A
ωax
∑
ca ∈Z+
caP
{
ca | σR, x, p
}
. (21)
The last summation is the expeted value of ca, which is λa .
Replacing this with λa from Eq. (4) gives Eq. (5).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proofs for Equilibrium 1 and 2 are similar to the proof
for Lemma 1. Equilibrium 3 is a partially-separating PBNE.
6This mechanism works if the laws are completely enforceable. But it
pressures strategic designers or users to not follow the law
Each player uses the mixed-strategy that makes the other player
indifferent. Strategies σR∗o (g | p, b) and σR∗v (g | p, b) which
satisfy Eq. (15) make deceptive senders exactly indifferent
between m = p and m = w. Thus, they can play the mixed-
strategy in Eq. (17), which makes strong and active receivers
exactly indifferent between a = g and a = t. This allows
the strong receivers to play a mixed-strategy. The proof of
Equilibrium 4 follows a similar logic.
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